United States v. Windsor and the Role of State Law in Defining Rights Claims by Young, Ernest A.
 39	  
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
ONLINE 
VOLUME	  99	   SEPTEMBER	  2013	   NUMBER	  1	  
ESSAY	  
	  
UNITED	  STATES	  V.	  WINDSOR	  AND	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  STATE	  LAW	  IN	  DEFINING	  RIGHTS	  CLAIMS	  
Ernest	  A.	  Young*	  RITING	   in	   1953,	  Henry	  Hart	   and	  Herbert	  Wechsler	   famously	  said	  that	  “[f]ederal	  law	  is	  generally	  interstitial	  in	  its	  nature	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Congress	  acts	  .	  .	  .	  against	  the	  background	  of	  the	  total	  corpus	  juris	  of	  the	   states	   in	  much	   the	  way	   that	   a	   state	   legislature	  acts	   against	   the	  background	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  assumed	  to	  govern	  unless	  changed	  by	   legislation.”1	  Federal	   law,	   in	  other	  words,	   is	  not	  a	  complete	  sys-­‐tem.	  It	  does	  not	  purport	  to—and,	  given	  the	  limited	  and	  enumerated	  nature	   of	   Congress’s	   powers—could	   not	   purport	   to	   create	   or	   de-­‐scribe	  a	  complete	  catalog	  of	  rights	  and	  duties	   for	  our	  society.	  Even	  in	  areas	  where	  Congress	  has	  power	  to	  act,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  enacting	  federal	  law	  often	  means	  that	  federal	  authority	  remains	  unexercised.	  The	   result	   is	   that,	   by	   federal	   disability	   or	   federal	   inaction,	   our	   law	  leaves	  open	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  questions	  to	  be	  answered	  by	  the	  states.	  
	   *	  Alston	  &	  Bird	  Professor,	  Duke	  Law	  School.	  I	  was	  the	  primary	  author	  of	  the	  Brief	  of	  Federalism	  Scholars	  as	  Amici	  Curiae	  in	  Support	  of	  Respondent	  Windsor	  in	  United	  States	  
v.	   Windsor,	   133	   S.	   Ct.	   2675	   (2013)	   (No.	   12-­‐307),	   available	   at	  http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2858/,	   and	   I	   am	   indebted	   to	  my	  co-­‐authors	  in	  that	  endeavor	  for	  their	  insights	  on	  Windsor.	  This	  essay	  focuses	  on	  Justice	  Kennedy’s	   actual	   opinion,	   and	   although	   my	   comments	   here	   overlap	   somewhat	   with	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  the	  brief,	  none	  of	  my	  co-­‐authors	  should	  be	  blamed	  for	  what	  I	  say	  here.	  1 Richard	  H.	  Fallon,	  Jr.	  et	  al.,	  Hart	  and	  Wechsler’s	  The	  Federal	  Courts	  and	  the	  Federal	  System	  459	  (6th	  ed.	  2009).	  The	  quoted	  text	  is	  carried	  over	  from	  the	  1953	  first	  edition.	  Henry	  M.	  Hart,	  Jr.	  &	  Herbert	  Wechsler,	  The	  Federal	  Courts	  and	  the	  Federal	  System	  435	  (1953).	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  99:1 The	  Supreme	  Court’s	  recent	  decision	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Windsor2	  is	   best	   understood	   from	   this	   Legal	   Process	   perspective.	   Windsor	  struck	   down	   Section	   3	   of	   the	   federal	   Defense	   of	   Marriage	   Act	  (“DOMA”),	   which	   defined	   marriage	   as	   exclusively	   between	   a	   man	  and	  a	  woman	  for	  purposes	  of	  federal	  law.3	  Much	  early	  commentary,	  including	   Professor	   Neomi	   Rao’s	   essay	   in	   these	   pages,4	   has	   found	  Justice	  Kennedy’s	  opinion	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  be	  “muddled”	  and	  unclear	  as	  to	  its	  actual	  rationale.	  But	  the	  trouble	  with	  Windsor	  is	  not	  that	  the	  opinion	  is	  muddled	  or	  vague;	  the	  rationale	  is	  actually	  quite	  evident	  on	  the	  face	  of	  Justice	  Kennedy’s	  opinion.5	  The	  trouble	  is	  simply	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  rationale	  that	  many	  observers	  expected	  or	  wanted.	  The	   Court	   had	   three	   obvious	   alternatives	   in	   Windsor.	   One	   ap-­‐proach,	   articulated	   by	   the	   plaintiff	   in	   the	   case	   and	   by	   the	   Obama	  Administration	   in	   its	   letter	   explaining	   why	   it	   would	   not	   defend	  DOMA’s	   constitutionality,	  was	   to	   recognize	   sexual	   orientation	   as	   a	  suspect	  classification	  under	  the	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause;	  this	  would	  have	   required	   DOMA	   to	   pass	   some	   level	   of	   heightened	   scrutiny,	  which	   it	  most	   likely	  would	   have	   failed.6	   A	   second	   route	   to	   height-­‐ened	   scrutiny—one	   at	   least	   suggested	   by	   Lawrence	   v.	   Texas7—would	  have	  run	  through	  substantive	  due	  process,	  recognizing	  same-­‐sex	  couples’	  right	  to	  marry	  as	  fundamental	  much	  like	  their	  ability	  to	  	   2 133	  S.	  Ct.	  2675	  (2013).	  3 Pub.	  L.	  104-­‐199,	  110	  Stat.	  2419	  (1996)	  (codified	  at	  1	  U.S.C.	  §	  7	  (2012)).	  4 Neomi	   Rao,	   The	   Trouble	   with	   Dignity	   and	   Rights	   of	   Recognition,	   99	   Va.	   L.	   Rev.	  Online	   29,	   31	   (2013),	  http://www.virginialawreview.org/content/pdfs/99/Online/Rao	   	   .pdf;	   see	   also	   San-­‐ford	  Levinson,	  A	  Brief	  Comment	  on	  Justice	  Kennedy’s	  Opinion	  in	  Windsor,	  Balkinization	  (June	  26,	  2013,	  11:50	  PM),	  http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-­‐brief-­‐comment-­‐on-­‐justice-­‐kennedys.html	   (noting	   “the	   intellectual	   awkwardness	   of	   [Kennedy’s]	   opinion”	  and	  comparing	  it	  to	  “a	  camel	  (i.e.,	  a	  horse	  designed	  by	  a	  committee)”);	  Jeffrey	  Rosen	  &	  Michael	   McConnell,	   Debating	   the	   Court’s	   Gay	   Marriage	   Decisions,	   The	   New	   Republic	  (June	   26,	   2013),	   http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113646/supreme-­‐court-­‐strikes-­‐down-­‐doma-­‐dismisses-­‐prop-­‐8-­‐debate	  (“[T]he	  DOMA	  decision	  is	  a	   logical	  mish-­‐mash,	  portending	  more	  litigation	  and	  more	  instability.”).	  5 For	  a	  more	  extended	  exegesis	  of	  that	  rationale	  than	  I	  can	  undertake	  here,	  see	  Ernest	  A.	  Young	  &	  Erin	  C.	  Blondel,	  Federalism,	  Liberty,	  and	  Equality	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Wind-­‐
sor,	  2012–2013	  Cato	  Sup.	  Ct.	  Rev.	  (forthcoming	  Sept.	  2013).	  6 See	  Brief	  on	  the	  Merits	  for	  Respondent	  Edith	  Schlain	  Windsor	  at	  17,	  Windsor,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  2675	  (No.	  12-­‐307);	  Press	  Release,	  Dep’t	  of	  Justice,	  Letter	  from	  the	  Attorney	  General	  to	  Congress	  on	  Litigation	  Involving	  the	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  (Feb.	  23,	  2011),	  availa-­‐ble	   at	   http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-­‐ag-­‐223.html	   (arguing	   for	  heightened	  equal	  protection	  scrutiny).	  	  7 539	  U.S.	  558,	  578	  (2003).	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   41 engage	  in	  sexual	  relations.8	  A	  third	  alternative,	  pressed	  hard	  in	  dis-­‐sents	  by	   Justices	  Scalia	   and	  Alito,9	  would	  have	   rejected	  heightened	  judicial	   scrutiny	   and	   left	   the	   legality	   and	   recognition	   of	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  entirely	  to	  the	  political	  process.	  Professor	   Rao	   seems	   to	   believe	   that	   these	   were	   the	   only	   three	  choices.	  As	  she	  reads	  it,	  the	  majority	  opinion’s	  “use	  of	  dignity	  identi-­‐fies	   a	   novel	   constitutional	   right	   to	   recognition	   unconnected	   to	   any	  substantive	  right.”10	  The	  problem,	  if	  I	  understand	  her	  argument	  cor-­‐rectly,	  is	  that	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  create	  a	  fundamental	  right	  to	  same-­‐sex	   marriage	   similar,	   for	   instance,	   to	   the	   fundamental	   right	   to	   an	  abortion	  recognized	   in	  Roe	  v.	  Wade.11	   “Unlike	  Windsor,”	   she	  writes,	  “most	  equality	  decisions	  focus	  on	  universal	  rights	  and	  freedoms.”12	  I	  am	  not	  sure,	  however,	  why	  one	  would	  insist	  that	  heightened	  consti-­‐tutional	   scrutiny	   must	   always	   turn	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   some	   sub-­‐stantive	   right.	   Equal	   protection	   claims,	   after	   all,	   typically	   focus	   on	  the	   classification	   drawn	   by	   the	   government—not	   on	   the	   “substan-­‐tive	  right”	  that	  the	  classification	  implicates.	  It	   is	  true	  that	  the	  equal	  protection	  cases	  Rao	  cites—Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education13	  and	  Lov-­‐
ing	   v.	   Virginia14—stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   education	   and	   mar-­‐riage,	   respectively.	   But	   the	   critical	   fact	   in	   both	   cases	   was	   that	   the	  government	  was	  discriminating	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  and	  other	  cases	  make	  clear	  that	  racial	  classifications	  trigger	  strict	  scrutiny	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  some	  other	  “substantive	  right”	  in	  the	  picture.	  If	  a	  mu-­‐nicipality	   says	   that	   only	   white	   people	   can	   water	   their	   lawns	   on	  prime-­‐numbered	   Thursdays,	   that	   is	   subject	   to	   strict	   scrutiny,	   too,	  even	  if	  the	  “substantive”	  right	  to	  do	  so	  is	  trivial.	  By	  insisting	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  justify	  strict	  scrutiny	  by	  rec-­‐ognizing	   a	   substantive	   right	   to	   same-­‐sex	  marriage,	   then,	   Professor	  	   8 Technically	  speaking,	  equal	  protection	  arguments	  directed	  toward	  the	  federal	  gov-­‐ernment	  must	  also	  rely	  on	  substantive	  due	  process,	  since	  the	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  by	  its	  terms	  applies	  only	  to	  the	  states.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Bolling	  v.	  Sharpe,	  347	  U.S.	  497	  (1954).	  But	  the	  Court	  has	  nonetheless	  maintained	  a	  distinct	  “equal	  protection”	  jurisprudence	  in	  cases	   involving	   federal	   discrimination	   just	   as	   it	   does	   in	   cases	   challenging	   state	   laws.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Adarand	  Constructor’s,	  Inc.	  v.	  Peña,	  515	  U.S.	  200,	  217	  (1995).	  9 See	  Windsor,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2706−07	  (Scalia,	   J.,	  dissenting);	   id.	  at	  2718−19	  (Alito,	   J.,	  dissenting).	  10 Rao,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  30.	  11 410	  U.S.	  113	  (1973).	  12 Rao,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  32.	  13 347	  U.S.	  483,	  490	  (1954).	  14 388	  U.S.	  1,	  12	  (1967).	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   logically	   rules	  out	  even	  Edith	  Windsor’s	   straightforward	  equal	  protection	   argument	   described	   above.	   That	   would	   certainly	   be	   a	  novel	  conclusion,	  and	  I	  doubt	  it	  could	  be	  defended.	  But	  this	  difficulty	  in	  Rao’s	  argument	  highlights	  the	  reality	  that	  arguments	  for	  “recogni-­‐tion”	  are	  not	  nearly	  as	  unusual	  in	  constitutional	  law	  as	  she	  suggests.	  A	   number	   of	   constitutional	   provisions—including,	   but	   not	   limited	  to,	   the	   Equal	   Protection	   Clause—are	   agnostic	   about	   underlying	  “substantive”	  rights	  but	  require	   that,	  once	   the	  government	  extends	  those	   rights	   to	   some	  persons	  or	  groups,	   they	  must	  extend	   them	   to	  other	   similarly-­‐situated	   persons.	   The	   Privileges	   and	   Immunities	  Clause	  of	  Article	  IV,15	  for	  example,	  creates	  no	  substantive	  rights,	  but	  it	   requires	   any	   given	   state	   to	   “recognize”	   out-­‐of-­‐staters	   as	   equally	  entitled	  to	  the	  privileges	  and	  immunities	  that	  it	  does	  choose	  to	  cre-­‐ate.	  The	  Due	  Process	  and	  Takings	  Clauses16	  do	  not	  themselves	  create	  any	   property	   rights,	   but	   they	   require	   governments	   to	   “recognize”	  the	  property	  rights	  that	  are	  created	  by	  not	  depriving	  people	  of	  those	  rights	  without	  fair	  procedures	  and	  just	  compensation.17	  And	  the	  Full	  Faith	   and	   Credit	   Clause	   requires	   states	   to	   recognize	   the	   “public	  [a]cts,	  [r]ecords,	  and	  judicial	  [p]roceedings	  of	  every	  other	  [s]tate.”18	  Given	  the	  well-­‐understood	  importance	  of	  these	  provisions,	  it	  is	  curi-­‐ous	  to	  hear	  Rao	  assert	  that	  “recognition	  is	  not	  a	  freedom	  or	  right	  in	  any	  meaningful	  sense.”19	  These	  examples	  all	  have	  a	  common	  theme,	  of	  course.	  The	  respec-­‐tive	   constitutional	   provisions	   require	   governments	   to	   recognize	  rights	   that	   they	   have	   already	   created,	   or	   that	   other	   governments	  have	  created,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  positive	   law.	  Professor	  Rao	  might	  well	  want	   to	   distinguish	   them	   from	  Windsor	   on	   the	   basis	   that	  Windsor	  required	  “recognition”	  of	  a	  free-­‐floating	  dignity	  interest	  without	  any	  
	   15 U.S.	  Const.	  art.	  IV,	  §	  2,	  cl.	  1.	  16 U.S.	  Const.	  amend.	  V;	  U.S.	  Const.	  amend.	  XIV,	  §	  1.	  17 This	   is	   true,	  moreover,	   even	  when	   the	   depriving	   government	   is	   not	   the	   one	   that	  created	  the	  property	  right	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  18 U.S.	   Const.	   art.	   IV,	   §	  1;	   see	   also	   id.	   §	  2,	   cl.	   2	   (requiring	   states	   to	   recognize	   other	  states’	   criminal	  proceedings	  by	  extraditing	   fugitives);	   id.	  §	  2,	   cl.	  3	   (requiring	  states	   to	  recognize	  other	  states’	  slavery	  laws	  by	  repatriating	  fugitive	  slaves).	  It	  would	  not	  be	  too	  much	  to	  say	  that	  the	  first	  two	  sections	  of	  Article	  IV	  are	  all	  about	  recognition.	  19 Rao,	   supra	  note	  4,	  at	  34;	   see	  also	   id.	   at	  33−34	  (“Recognition	  by	  our	  communities	  and	  even	  our	  political	  institutions	  may	  be	  an	  important	  human	  need,	  but	  it	  has	  not	  pre-­‐viously	  been	  treated	  as	  a	  constitutional	  right.”).	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   43 similar	   grounding.20	   This	   answer,	   however,	   would	   fundamentally	  misread	   Justice	   Kennedy’s	   opinion	   for	   the	   Court.	   At	   literally	   every	  turn,	  that	  opinion	  emphasized	  the	  fact	  that	  state	  law	  had	  recognized	  the	   validity	   of	   Edith	  Windsor’s	  marriage.	   “[T]he	   State’s	   decision	   to	  give	  this	  class	  of	  persons	  the	  right	  to	  marry,”	  Kennedy	  wrote,	  “con-­‐ferred	  upon	  them	  a	  dignity	  and	  status	  of	  immense	  import.	  When	  the	  State	  used	   its	  historic	   and	  essential	   authority	   to	  define	   the	  marital	  relation	   in	   this	  way,	   its	   role	   and	   its	   power	   in	  making	   the	   decision	  enhanced	   the	   recognition,	   dignity,	   and	   protection	   of	   the	   class	   in	  their	  own	  community.”21	  The	  right	  for	  which	  Edith	  Windsor	  sought	  recognition,	  in	  other	  words,	  was	  just	  as	  grounded	  in	  positive	  law	  as	  any	  property	  right	  asserted	  in	  a	  Takings	  case.	  The	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  operates	  differently	  than	  the	  Takings	  Clause,	   of	   course,	   and	   it	   will	   help	   to	   pin	   down	   exactly	   how	   New	  York’s	  recognition	  of	  Mrs.	  Windsor’s	  marriage	  propelled	  her	  equali-­‐ty	   claim.	   Most	   important,	   state	   law	   defined	   the	   frame	   in	   which	  DOMA’s	   classification	   had	   to	   be	   judged.	   Every	   equal	   protection	  plaintiff	  must	   establish	   that	   the	   government	   has	   discriminated	   be-­‐tween	  similarly-­‐situated	  persons,22	  but	  that	  question	  has	  been	  near-­‐ly	  intractable	  in	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  debate.	  Proponents	  say	  that	  that	   the	  marital	   relationship	   is	   independent	  of	  who	   is	  getting	  mar-­‐ried;	  opponents	  insist	  that	  “marriage”	  is	  uniquely	  a	  relationship	  be-­‐tween	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman.	  It	  has	  been,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  be,	  diffi-­‐cult	   for	   courts	   to	   resolve	   this	   question	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   legal	  interpretation,	  without	  recourse	  to	  the	  judges’	  moral	  priors.	  The	  beauty	  of	  Justice	  Kennedy’s	  opinion	  in	  Windsor	  is	  that	  it	  was	  able	   to	  resolve	   this	  difficult	   issue	  without	  resort	   to	   judicial	   fiat.	   In-­‐stead,	   the	  Court	   relied	  on	  New	  York’s	  own	  resolution	  of	   that	  ques-­‐tion,	   which	   was	   ultimately—and	   appropriately—a	   political	   one.	  Hence,	   state	   law	  defined	   the	   class	  of	   similarly	   situated	  persons	   for	  	   20 See	  id.	  at	  31	  (“Windsor	  protects	  only	  the	  dignity	  of	  having	  your	  personal	  relation-­‐ships	  recognized	  by	  the	  federal	  government.”).	  21 Windsor,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2692;	  see	  also	  Randy	  Barnett,	  Federalism	  Marries	  Liberty	  in	  the	   DOMA	   Decision,	   Volokh	   Conspiracy	   (June	   26,	   2013,	   4:52	   PM),	  http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/26/federalism-­‐marries-­‐liberty-­‐in-­‐the-­‐doma-­‐decision	  (emphasizing	  this	  aspect	  of	  Windsor).	  22 See,	   e.g.,	   City	   of	   Cleburne	   v.	   Cleburne	   Living	   Ctr.,	   Inc.,	   473	   U.S.	   432,	   439	   (1985)	  (“The	  Equal	  Protection	  Clause	  of	   the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	   .	  .	  .	   is	   essentially	  a	  direc-­‐tion	  that	  all	  persons	  similarly	  situated	  should	  be	  treated	  alike.”).	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  99:1 purposes	  of	  Windsor’s	  equal	  protection	  claim.23	  As	  Justice	  Kennedy	  explained,	  	  The	  class	  to	  which	  DOMA	  directs	  its	  restrictions	  and	  restraints	  are	   those	   persons	   who	   are	   joined	   in	   same-­‐sex	   marriages	   made	  lawful	  by	   the	  State.	  DOMA	  singles	  out	  a	   class	  of	  persons	  deemed	  by	  a	  State	  entitled	  to	  recognition	  and	  protection	  to	  enhance	  their	  own	   liberty.	   It	   imposes	   a	   disability	   on	   the	   class	   by	   refusing	   to	  acknowledge	  a	  status	  the	  State	  finds	  to	  be	  dignified	  and	  proper.24	  	  There	   is	  much	  more	  than	  “a	  whiff	  of	   federalism	  here,”	  as	  Professor	  Rao	  puts	   it.25	  Rather,	   as	  Professors	  Hart	   and	  Wechsler	  pointed	  out	  long	  ago,26	  the	  federal	  equal	  protection	  claim	  operates	  against	  an	  in-­‐dispensable	  backdrop	  of	  state	  law.	  Far	  from	  being	  untethered	  to	  any	  substantive	   right,	   Justice	  Kennedy’s	   “right	   of	   recognition”	   is	   firmly	  grounded	  in	  a	  substantive	  right	  created	  under	  the	  law	  of	  New	  York.	  This	   argument	   also	   answers	   Professor	   Rao’s	   criticism	   that	  “recognition	   rights,	   standing	   alone,	   require	   picking	   one	   groups’	  claim	  over	  another.”27	   It	   is	  not	  clear	   that	   this	   is	   true	  even	  on	  Rao’s	  own	   terms;	   I	   fail	   to	   understand,	   for	   example,	   why	   my	   claim	   for	  recognition	   of	  my	   marriage	   is	   normatively	   equivalent	   to	   someone	  else’s	  claim	  that	  my	  marriage	  should	  not	  be	  recognized	  (as	  opposed	  to	   their	  claim	  that	   their	  marriage	  should	  be).28	  But	  putting	   that	  ob-­‐jection	  aside,	  the	  crucial	  point	   is	  that	   in	  Windsor,	   the	  choice	  among	  competing	  claims	  was	  made	  by	  the	  state	  of	  New	  York—not	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court.	  What	  the	  Court	  said	  was	  simply	  that	  once	  New	  York	  
	   23 See	  Windsor,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2694	  (“DOMA	  contrives	  to	  deprive	  some	  couples	  married	  under	   the	   laws	   of	   their	   State,	   but	   not	   other	   couples,	   of	   both	   rights	   and	   responsibili-­‐ties.”).	  24 Id.	  at	  2695−96.	  25 Rao,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  37.	  26 See	  supra	  text	  accompanying	  note	  1.	  27 Rao,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  34.	  28 It	  will	  not	  do	  to	  say,	  as	  Professor	  Rao	  does,	  that	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  opponent’s	  claim	  is	  a	  claim	  for	  recognition	  of	  their	  heterosexual	  marriage	  as	  the	  only	  kind.	  That	  is	  just	  a	  play	  on	  words;	  I	  can	  always	  frame	  a	  desire	  to	  meddle	  in	  someone	  else’s	  affairs	  as	  a	  desire	  that	  my	  preferences	  be	  recognized	  as	  the	  one	  true	  way.	  One	  can	  imagine	  claims	  for	  recognition	  that	  are,	  in	  fact,	  mutually	  exclusive;	  for	  instance,	  I	  might	  claim	  the	  land	  on	  which	  my	  house	  sits	  under	  traditional	  American	  principles	  of	  property	  law,	  while	  a	  Native	  American	  tribe	  might	  press	  for	  recognition	  of	  their	  ancestral	  rights	  to	  the	  land.	  But	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  not	  that	  kind	  of	  situation.	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  made	  its	  choice,	  Congress	  could	  not	  validly	  set	  that	  choice	  aside	  by	  enacting	  DOMA.	  One	  might	  still	  object	  that	  the	  Court	  did	  have	  to	  choose	  between	  New	   York’s	   resolution	   of	   these	   competing	   claims	   about	   marriage	  and	   the	   quite	   different	   resolution	   of	   those	   claims	   by	   Congress	   in	  DOMA.29	  And	  it	  is	  worth	  remembering	  that	  the	  “interstitial”	  concep-­‐tion	  of	   federal	   law	  articulated	  by	  Professors	  Hart	  and	  Wechsler	  as-­‐sumed	  that	  state	  law	  would	  “govern	  unless	  changed	  by	  legislation.”30	  DOMA,	  of	  course,	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  do	  precisely	  that—at	  least	  where	  federal	  programs,	  benefits,	   and	  obligations	  are	  concerned.	  Windsor	  did	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  instances,	  Con-­‐gress	   may	   refuse	   to	   recognize	   state-­‐sanctioned	   marriages—although	   it	   made	   clear	   that	   generally	   federal	   law	   must	   take	   state	  marriage	   law	   as	   it	   finds	   it.	   The	   Court	   cited	   the	   immigration	   anti-­‐fraud	  statute,	   for	  instance,	  which	  treats	  otherwise-­‐married	  persons	  as	  unmarried	  if	  their	  marriage	  “was	  entered	  into	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  procuring	  an	  alien’s	  admission	  as	  an	  immigrant.”31	  But	  DOMA	  “has	  a	  far	  greater	  reach”	  and	  “is	  directed	  to	  a	  class	  of	  persons	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  New	  York,	  and	  of	  11	  other	  States,	  have	  sought	  to	  protect.”32	  The	  problem	  was	  thus	  twofold:	  DOMA	  did	  not	   fit	  any	  particular	   federal	  statutory	   program	   or	   interest,	   and	   it	   directly	   interfered	  with	   New	  York’s	  exercise	  of	  its	  own	  sovereign	  authority	  to	  define	  family	  rela-­‐tionships.33	  A	   close	   reading	   of	   Justice	   Kennedy’s	   opinion	   indicates	   that	  DOMA’s	   intrusion	   on	   state	   prerogatives	   affected	   the	   equal	   protec-­‐tion	  analysis	   in	  two	  more	  specific	  ways.	   It	  seems	  to	  have	  ratcheted	  up	  the	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  somewhat;	  in	  particular,	  the	  Court	  analyzed	  only	   the	   interests	  actually	   reflected	   in	   the	   legislative	   record	   rather	  than	  formulating	  hypothetical	  interests	  where	  necessary	  to	  save	  the	  
	   29 I	  take	  it	  that	  Professor	  Rao	  would	  not	  object	  on	  this	  ground,	  since	  she	  writes	  that	  “Windsor	   could	  have	  been	  decided	  along	   federalism	   lines,	   recognizing	   the	   limited	  na-­‐ture	  of	  federal	  power	  with	  respect	  to	  definitions	  on	  marriage.”	  Rao,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  36.	  	  30 Hart	  &	  Wechsler,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  459	  (emphasis	  added).	  31 8	  U.S.C.	  §	  1186a(b)(1)(A)(i)	  (2006	  ed.	  and	  Supp.	  V),	  cited	  in	  Windsor,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2690.	  32 Windsor,	   133	  S.	  Ct.	   at	  2690;	   see	  also	   id.	   at	  2694	   (“DOMA	   frustrates	   [New	  York’s]	  objective	  [to	  eliminate	  inequality]	  through	  a	  system-­‐wide	  enactment	  with	  no	  identified	  connection	  to	  any	  particular	  area	  of	  federal	  law.”).	  33 See	  generally	  Young	  &	  Blondel,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  141−42.	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  99:1 statute.34	  And	  the	  Court	  also	  rejected	  Congress’s	  primary	  interest—to	   preserve	   the	   traditional	   definition	   of	   marriage—as	   an	   interest	  that	   the	   national	   government	   simply	   does	   not	   have.35	   Again,	   Con-­‐gress’s	   usurpation	   of	   the	   states’	   role	   was	   a	   pervasive	   factor	  throughout	   the	   Court’s	   equal	   protection	   analysis.36	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	  find	   instances	   in	  which	  the	  Court	  mentioned	  “dignity”	  without	  also	  stressing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state.37	  Contrary	   to	   the	   emerging	   narrative,	   then,	   the	   federalism	   argu-­‐ments	   in	  Windsor	  amounted	  to	  much	  more	  than	   just	  “some	  blather	  about	   traditional	   state	   sovereignty	  and	  marriage.”38	  No	  one	   should	  be	   surprised	   by	   this,	   because	   the	   structural	   element	   in	   Windsor	  emerges	  from	  something	  basic	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  rights.	  While	  it	  is	  true	   that	  we	   sometimes	   think	   of	   rights	   as	   universal,	   existing	   apart	  from	  particular	  societies	  and	  their	  institutions,	  this	  is	  hardly	  the	  on-­‐ly	  or	  even	  the	  most	  plausible	  view.	  The	  classical	  conservative	  posi-­‐tion,	   for	   example,	   sees	   rights	   as	   inevitably	   tied	   to	   the	   institutional	  context	  and	  traditions	  of	  a	  particular	  society.39	  Similarly,	  as	  Profes-­‐sor	   Anna	   Stilz	   has	   recently	   demonstrated,	   the	   Kantian	   tradition	  likewise	  sees	  the	  state	  as	  playing	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  defining	  individual	  human	  rights.40	  As	  she	  explains,	  Kant	  and	  Rousseau	  thought	  that	  the	  value	  of	  equal	  freedom	  could	  only	  be	  realized	  through	  the	  state.	  The	  reason	  they	  thought	  equal	  	   34 See	  Windsor,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  at	  2693	  (focusing	  on	  the	  purpose	  reflected	  in	  “[t]he	  history	  of	  DOMA’s	  enactment	  and	  its	  own	  text”).	  35 See	  id.	  at	  2693,	  2695	  (rejecting	  “the	  congressional	  purpose	  to	  influence	  or	  interfere	  with	  state	  sovereign	  choices	  about	  who	  may	  be	  married”	  as	  an	  improper	  purpose).	  36 See	  Young	  &	  Blondel,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  133.	  37 See,	   e.g.,	  Windsor,	   133	  S.	  Ct.	   at	  2693	   (observing	   that	   “interference	  with	   the	  equal	  dignity	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriages,	  a	  dignity	  conferred	  by	  the	  States	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  sovereign	  power,	  was	  more	  than	  an	  incidental	  effect	  of	  the	  federal	  statute”);	  id.	  at	  2694	  (insisting	  that	  “plac[ing]	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  .	  .	  .	  in	  a	  second-­‐tier	  marriage	  .	  .	  .	  demeans	  the	  couple,	  whose	  moral	  and	  sexual	  choices	  the	  Constitution	  protects	   .	   .	   .	  and	  whose	  rela-­‐tionship	  the	  State	  has	  sought	  to	  dignify”	  (citation	  omitted)).	  38 Levinson,	  supra	  note	  4.	  	  39 See,	   e.g.,	   Edmund	   Burke,	   Reflections	   on	   the	   Revolution	   in	   France	   51	   (Frank	   M.	  Turner,	  ed.,	  Yale	  Univ.	  Press	  2003)	  (1790)	  (“Government	  is	  not	  made	  in	  virtue	  of	  natu-­‐ral	  rights,	  which	  may	  and	  do	  exist	   in	  total	   independence	  of	   it	   .	   .	   .	   .	  But	  as	  the	   liberties	  and	  the	  restrictions	  vary	  with	  times	  and	  circumstances,	  and	  admit	  of	  infinite	  modifica-­‐tions,	  they	  cannot	  be	  settled	  upon	  any	  abstract	  rule	  .	  .	  .	  .”);	  see	  also	  Ernest	  Young,	  Redis-­‐covering	  Conservatism:	  Burkean	  Political	  Theory	  and	  Constitutional	  Interpretation,	  72	  N.C.	  L.	  Rev.	  619,	  642−59	  (1994)	  (discussing	  Burke’s	  philosophy).	  	  40 Anna	  Stilz,	  Liberal	  Loyalty:	  Freedom,	  Obligation,	  and	  the	  State	  27–56	  (2009).	  	  
  
2013]	   United	  States	  v.	  Windsor	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  State	  Law	   47 freedom	  required	  this	  kind	  of	  mediation	  was	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  es-­‐tablishment	  of	   the	  state,	   the	  value	  of	  equal	   freedom	  is	   indetermi-­‐
nate	  with	  respect	  to	  certain	  key	  questions.41	  Because	   abstract	   principles	   of	   equal	   freedom	   are	   “underspecified,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  directly	  applied,”	  we	  require	  a	  state	  to	  spec-­‐ify	  those	  principles’	  meanings	  in	  concrete	  situations	  through	  demo-­‐cratic	  processes.42	  This	  need	  is	  excruciatingly	  apparent	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  As	  I	  have	  already	  argued,	  it	   is	  not	  easy	  to	  resolve	  the	  ap-­‐propriate	  limits	  of	  a	  right	  to	  marriage	  by	  appeal	  to	  general	  constitu-­‐tional	   principles,	   and	   people	   of	   good	   will	   may	   likewise	   disagree	  about	  how	  general	  principles	  of	  justice	  map	  on	  to	  this	  issue.	  As	  the	  dissenters	   suggested	   in	   Windsor,	   a	   democratic	   resolution	   of	   the	  question	  may	  be	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do.	  In	  Professor	  Stilz’s	  terms,	  dem-­‐ocratic	   deliberation	   by	   the	   state	   fleshes	   out	   the	   otherwise-­‐indeterminate	  contours	  of	  the	  marriage	  right.	  But	  if	  democratic	  de-­‐liberation	  is	  to	  play	  this	  role,	  in	  a	  federal	  system	  like	  ours	  it	  becomes	  crucial	   to	   determine	  which	   level	   of	   government	   should	   resolve	   the	  question.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   some	   Platonic	   meaning	   of	   “marriage,”	  should	   that	   right’s	   indeterminate	   contours	   be	   resolved	   by	   a	   state	  community,	  or	  a	  national	  one?	  
Windsor	   did	   not	   hold	   that	   this	   question	   conclusively	   belongs	   to	  the	  states,	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  future	  courts	  will	  have	  to	  confront	  the	  question	   whether	   the	   Fourteenth	   Amendment	   precludes	   a	   state	  from	  adopting	  a	  definition	  of	  marriage	  that	  excludes	  same-­‐sex	  cou-­‐ples.	  That	  will	   be	  a	  hard	   case.	  What	   the	  Court	  did	   say,	  however,	   is	  that	  under	  our	   constitutional	   scheme	   the	  contours	  of	  marriage	  are	  questions	  for	  the	  states	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  and	  that	  Congress	  needs	  a	   particularly	   good	   reason	   to	   interfere	  with	   a	   state’s	   resolution	   of	  such	  questions.	  The	  right	  of	  “recognition”	  in	  Windsor,	  then,	  was	  not	  some	  untethered	  judicial	  creation,	  but	  rather	  an	  entitlement	  to	  fed-­‐eral	   recognition	  of	   state	   law	  rights	  created	   in	   the	  democratic	  exer-­‐cise	   of	   the	   states’	   reserved	  powers.	   That	   right	   is	   utterly	   familiar—and	  fundamental.	  	  	   41 Id.	  at	  21.	  	  42 Id.	  at	  40,	  57−60.	  	  
